Louisiana Law Review
Volume 7 | Number 4
May 1947

Sales - Litigious Redemption
James R. Alexander

Repository Citation
James R. Alexander, Sales - Litigious Redemption, 7 La. L. Rev. (1947)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol7/iss4/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

1947]

NOTES

If the act committed were a single tort, it is clear the defendant
would have to support his plea of prescription by proving the
act was committed over one year before the suit was brought.
Similarly, if the plaintiff were suing for damages inflicted by a
serious of separate torts, some, but not all, of which were committed more than a year prior to the date of institution of suit, it
would be incumbent on defendants to show which of these torts
were prescribed. Therefore, it follows that in cases involving
continuing wrongful conduct, the defendant should prove what
part of the damage was sustained prior to the period fixed for
prescription. It has been suggested that the practice of requiring
plaintiff, rather than defendant, to apportion the damage in order
to avoid the plea of prescription is attributable to an erroneous
interpretation of the misleading language of the 1902 amendment
to Article 3537. 9
J. LuTmH

JORDAN, JR.

SALEs-LTIGious REE1PNI-Duncan R. Crain filed suit
for partition by licitation, alleging himself to be owner of 32/33
interest in a tract of land. Defendants, plaintiff's children, admitted his right to a partition, but claimed that he was owner of
only 135/264 interest and prayed that partition be in kind. After
issue had been joined, three other parties, hereinafter referred
to as plaintiffs, were substituted as parties plaintiff. They had
acquired all of Duncan Crain's interest in the land by deed after
the suit had commenced, pursuant to an option purchased and
recorded prior to filing of Duncan Crain's petition.
At the trial, defendants tendered to the plaintiff the amount
the latter had paid for Crain's interest, and asked that they be
declared owners of plaintiffs' interest under Article 2652.2 The
trial court held that defendants had the right to acquire all of the
plaintiffs' interest by tendering the amount paid by. them to
Crain.
9. Art. 3537, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 33 of 1902,
discussed by Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, supra p. 246.
1. For a survey of the subject of litigious rights see Comments, The
Transfer of Litigious Rights in Louisiana Civil Law (1939) 1 LouISIANA LAW
REVIEW 593 and 818, and The Sale of a Litigious Right (1939) 13 Tulane L.
Rev. 448.
2. Art. 2652, La. Civil Code of 1870. He against whom a litigious right
has been transferred, may get himself released by paying to the transferee
the real price of the transfer, together with interest from its date.
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On appeal the supreme court found that only a 121/264 interest (256/264 claimed by Crain less the 135/264 conceded to
him in defendants' answer) was in contestation and therefore
litigious under Article 2653- and allowed defendants to redeem
that part. Crain v. Waldron, 27 So. .(2d) 333 (La. 1946).
The applicability of Article 2652 to the sale of a right which
is only litigious in part had not been decided previously, although
the question was raised in one case.'
The decision in the principal case is in harmony with the
opinions of the French commentators, who assert that in a similar problem where several things have been sold at the same
time, including a litigious right, and for a single price, the redemption could be exercised as to this right alone5 However,
these writers point out that a separate valuation should be made
in order to determine that part of the price paid for the litigious
right." The court in the present case made an arbitrary apportionment, finding 121/264 of the plaintiffs' interest litigious and
reimbursing them 121/264 of the total price paid by them. Justice
Fournet dissented on this point, stating that there was nothing in
the record to guide the court in determining how much was paid
for the portion of the property in contestation and how much for
the portion not in contestation.
It would have been extremely difficult in this particular case
to determine just what proportion of the purchase price was
paid for that part of Crain's interest which was litigious, since
plaintiffs purchased an undivided interest in a tract of land, of
which an undivided 121/264 was litigious. The French writers
obviously did not contemplate a transaction such as this, but
were speaking of the situation in which a litigious right is sold
along with other separate things for a single price, and where
the litigious right could be easily distinguished and separately
appraised.
The decision also follows the reasoning in Smith v. Cook,7
3. Art. 2653, La. Civil Code of 1870. A right is said to be litigious, whenever there exists a suit and contestation on the same.
4. Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassel, 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936).
5. 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait Pratique de Droit Civil Francais (1932)
364, n. 936; 5 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais (5 ed. 1907) 253,
§ 359, N. 32; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerle, Traite Theorique et Pratique de Droit
Civil (3 ed. 1908) 948, n. 936.
6. "Si plusiers choses ont et ced~es en meme temps que la crdance litigleuse et pour un prix unique, le retrait doit 6tre exerce pour cette seule
crdance litigieuse et une ventilation et necessaire pour determiner la part
du prix qui correspond d la crgance retrayde." 10 Planiol et Ripert, loc. cit.
supra note 4.
7. 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1938).
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which held that where a portion of the thing in contestation was
transferred during the litigation, litigious redemption could be
exercised as to that portion. The court was of the opinion that not
to allow the party against whom the right was held to redeem
would make it easy for the transferror to prevent the operation
of Article 2652 by retaining a small portion of the thing. The
same type of reasoning would apply in the present case. If a
party were not allowed to redeem that part of the thing which is
litigious, the vendor of a litigious right could prevent redemption by selling along with the right something non-litigious and
receiving one price for the whole.
Another contention of the plaintiffs was based on Article
1289 of the Civil Code' and Article 1700 of the Code Napoleon.9
The latter, from which Article 2653 of the Civil Code is derived,
defines a right as litigious when there exists -a suit and contestation on the existence of the right. Plaintiffs urged that since there
was no dispute as to Crain's right to a partition (and this action
was primarily one of partition), there was no contestation as to
the existence of the right, thus putting the interest acquired by
plaintiffs out of the purview of Article 2653. The court disposed
of the contention by holding that there was a dispute as to part
of the plaintiffs' interest, since the defendants asserted a claim
to part of the right claimed by. Crain.
It is interesting to note that there was also a dispute concerning the manner in which the partition was to be made, i. e.,
by licitation or in kind; and the lower court took cognizance of
this fact in allowng defendants to redeem the whole of the interest purchased by plaintiffs. 10
The supreme court, however, quite properly disregarded this
point, and held plaintiffs' right to be litigious only as to the actual
portion in dispute. This view is supported by Article 1335,11 which
8. Art. 1289, La. Civil Code of 1870. "No one can be compelled to hold
property with- another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one
has a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action
of partition."
9. Art. 1700, French Civil Code. "La chose est cens8e litigieuse des qu'il y a
process et contestation sur le fond dis droit." See also Comment (1939) 13
Tulane L. Rev. 448, 450.
10. "There are definitely two points which are contested. The first is the
ownership of the property in question and the second is whether the property Is to be divided in kind or by licitation." Crain v. Waldron, Supreme
Court Record, Appeal from 14th Judicial District for the Parish of Cameron
at page 43.
11. Art. 1335, La. Civil Code of 1870. "All points, arising before the judge
having cognizance of the suit for partition, on the manner of making the
collation or other operations relating to the partition, being merely incidental to the suit, shall be decided on the simple motion of the party inter-
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states that in a suit for partition other operations are merely in2
cidental to the suit.'

It is concluded from the above that in a suit for partition
where the only point in dispute is the manner in which the partition is to be made, a purchaser of the interest of one of the parties
to the suit will not be liable to litigious redemption.
Plaintiffs argued that since the sale was made pursuant to a
written promise to sell acquired by them from Crain and recorded prior to the filing of the suit, title passed as of date of
the prior agreement. The court repudiated this contention, stating that although a written promise to sell has been held to
amount to a sale in the sense that it gives the purchaser the right
to specific performance, the promise to sell in this case was an
.option, did not bind. the plaintiffs, and after suit had begun they
still had the privilege of deciding whether or not they desired to
make the purchase. The language of the court indicates that Article 2652 would not apply where an executory contract of sale
was entered into before the right became litigious.'
This decision, interpreting the applicable Articles of the Civil
Code, adds to the previous jurisprudence on the subject of litigious rights the following conclusions:
(1) Where a thing 4 sold is partly litigious, redemption will
be allowed for that part.
(2) In a suit for partition, where the only dispute concerns
the manner of partition, sale of the thing subject to litigation will
not constitute the sale of a litigious right under Article 2652.1'
(3) There are indications that where a thing in litigation is
sold pursuant to an executory contract of sale made before the
commencement of the litigation, Article 2652 will 'not apply.
JAMEs R. ALEXANDER
ested in having them decided, the same being duly notified to the other
heirs or their attorneys, and a reasonable time- being granted to answer
thereto."
12. In United States v. 12,918.28 Acres of Land in Webster Parish, 50 F.
Supp. 712,720 (D. C. Ia. 1943), the court, listing the four essential conditions
of a litigious right, said: "(2) That the suit concerns fundamentally a right;
not a suit wherein both parties are in agreement upon the substance (fond)
of the right and are merely contesting auxiliaries or derivatives from the
right, such as rank of claims, right of accounting, etc., under the right."
13. The language of the court, however, is not conclusive on this point;
and such an indication would be contrary to the letter of Art. 2652, which
states "He against whom a litigious right has been transferred ....
"
14. The Louisiana jurisprudence is in accord with the unanimous opinion
of the French authorities to the effect that Article 2652 applies to immovables. See Comment (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEw 818, 823.
15. This rule should be applicable to Article 2447, La. Civil Code of 1870.
"Public officers connected with courts of justice ... can not purchase litigious rights, which fall under the jurisdiction of the tribunal in which they
exercise their functions

